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Should managers be liable for ill-conceived business decisions? One answer is given by U.S.
courts, which almost never hold managers liable for their mistakes. In this paper, we address the
question in a theoretical model of delegated decision making. We find that courts should indeed be
lenient as long as contracts are restricted to be linear. With more general compensation schemes, the
answer depends on the precision of the court’s signal. If courts make many mistakes in evaluating
decisions, they should not impose liability for poor business judgment.
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1 Introduction
Agents are legally bound to act in the interest of their principals. If they fail to exercise due care,
they must be liable for the losses – or so it seems. For corporate directors and officers (“managers”
for short) the law turns out to be quite different. It is governed by the “business judgment rule.”
The leading corporate law court in the U.S. summarized the rule’s effect as follows:
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“[I]n the absence of facts showing self-dealing or improper motive, a corporate officer
or director is not legally responsible to the corporation for losses that may be suffered
as a result of a decision that an officer made or that directors authorized in good faith.
There is a theoretical exception to this general statement that holds that some decisions
may be so ‘egregious’ that liability for losses they cause may follow even in the absence
of proof of conflict of interest or improper motivation. The exception, however, has
resulted in no awards of money judgments against corporate officers or directors in this
jurisdiction” Chancery Court of Delaware (1996).
This is a staggering statement given the potentially enormous agency costs in public corporations.
We therefore attempt to evaluate the business judgment rule in a theoretical model. Assuming
a risk-averse agent, we use the basic set-up of Lambert (1986), augmented by a liability rule. In
our model, liability is part and parcel of the manager’s contract. The compensation terms and the
standard of care are each set optimally. We consider two dimensions of manager behavior: the
effort in preparing a decision and the subsequent choice between a safe and a risky project. Courts
receive a signal of the manager’s conduct but the difficulties of adjudicating business decisions (and
of predicting the court’s judgment) create noise in the court’s signal. In our basic setup, the noise
affects only the court’s assessment of whether the manager rightly chose the risky project.
Our main results are the following: If the compensation scheme under the contract is linear,
courts should always be lenient. By contrast, non-linear contracts can work against the risk-deterrent
effect of liability. In this setting, courts should use precise signals. As the quality of the signal
declines, liability causes increasing costs to the principal. If the signal is very noisy, the court should
refrain from using it because liability exposes the agent to too much risk even if he is informed
and makes careful decisions. This result conforms to the business judgment rule’s prescription that
liability should obtain only in “egregious” cases (where signal precision is high) but not in others
(where signal precision is low). We thus offer an economic justification for the surprising forbearance
that U.S. law affords to corporate managers.
It appears that we are the first to formally analyze the business judgment rule and its leniency
towards managers.1 In a related contribution, Gutiérrez (2003) explains why shareholders may wish
1Hakenes and Schnabel (2012) study “manager liability” conditional on readily observable outcomes rather than
on a finding of negligence after a court proceeding.
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to protect managers by obtaining directors’ & officers’ (D&O) liability coverage or by eliminating
liability in the articles of incorporation. While the question resembles ours, the thrust of Gutiérrez’
argument is different: In her model, D&O insurance and liability limitations serve to determine the
amount of ex post litigation. Inefficiencies result only from shareholders spending too little or too
much on suing managers. Liability does not distort the agent’s incentives except when there is too
little of it. By contrast, we directly address the chilling effect that liability could have on risk-taking.
The paper begins with explaining the business judgment rule and its justification by courts
and legal commentators (section 2). Section 3 presents our model, section 4 contains our main
results. In section 5, we consider the possibility that managers can be held liable for a failure to take
risk. Section 6 relaxes the assumption that the courts can perfectly observe the manager’s effort in
preparing a decision, and section 7 concludes.
2 The business judgment rule
The classic statement of the business judgment rule is due to the Supreme Court of Delaware (1984):
“[There is] a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company. [. . . ] Absent an abuse of discretion, that
judgment will be respected by the courts.”
The passage sets out the legal structure of the business judgment rule in Delaware, the dominant
corporate law jurisdiction in the U.S.: To a limited degree, the courts reserve judgment on the
process of decision-making. To invoke the business judgment rule, managers must have considered
“all material information reasonably available to them.” Yet even at this stage of “process due
care,” there is a presumption that managers have lived up to their obligations and courts restrict
themselves to a gross negligence standard (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1984 and 2000). Once the
business judgment rule applies, the courts completely abstain from reviewing the substance of the
decision (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1984 and 2000). The effort and choice dimensions in our
model thus mirror the stages of “process due care” and “substantive due care” in the legal analysis
of manager liability cases.
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As a result of the business judgment rule, personal liability is only a remote threat for corporate
managers:
The Disney Case. In August 1995 the Walt Disney Company hired Michael Ovitz as President
of the corporation, only to terminate his employment fourteen months later with a severance
package of $130 million. The large payout was essentially mandated by the terms of the com-
pensation agreement. The board’s compensation committee had approved the key employment
terms in a one-hour meeting together with other agenda items. Although the courts found
this “decision-making process [to fall] far short of corporate governance ‘best practices,’ ” they
did not question the directors’ decision and dismissed any claim of personal liability (Supreme
Court of Delaware, 2006).
The Citigroup Case. Citigroup Inc. sustained very significant losses in 2007 and 2008 from its
exposure to the U.S. subprime residential mortgage market. Shareholders sued directors and
officers of Citigroup for failing to monitor risk in spite of a multitude of warning signs that
market conditions were deteriorating. Yet the Delaware Chancery Court ruled out director
liability at the outset. The court went so far as to deny a board duty to oversee business risk
because this would “involve courts in conducting hindsight evaluations of decisions at the heart
of the business judgment of directors” (Chancery Court of Delaware, 2009)
Judges and legal scholars offer a bunch of justifications for the surprising leniency of the business
judgment rule: It is said, first, that business decisions are highly specific to the particular situation
in which managers have to act. “The judges are not business experts” (Supreme Court of Michigan,
1919). The very same reason that prevents the corporate contract from being complete also impedes
the courts in adjudicating claims of mismanagement (Fischel, 1985). Second, legal commentators
point to the perils of judging in hindsight. The business judgment rule could serve to offset an
inclination to give too much weight to bad outcomes in evaluating ex ante behavior (Chancery
Court of Delaware, 2009; Eisenberg, 1993).
A third line of reasoning relates to the proper amount of risk-taking. If managers face a threat
of personal liability, the argument goes, they will shy away from risky but value-enhancing projects.
Instead of pursuing innovative opportunities they will stick to business as usual. Such fearful behavior
runs against the interest of shareholders, particularly in a public corporation where shareholders are
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well diversified (American Law Institute, 1992, p. 135; Chancery Court of Delaware, 1996; Allen,
Jacobs and Strine, 2002). Fourth, unfettered liability for negligence could reduce the supply of able
directors and executives. Compensation would rise as a result or the quality of managers would
decline (Allen, Jacobs and Strine, 2002; Black, Cheffins and Klausner, 2006b). A fifth and final
argument is that there are other and less costly mechanisms to discipline managers. One element
consists of price signals from the capital market that feed into stock-based compensation and the
market for corporate control. Reputational concerns in the managerial labor market are believed to
provide another powerful incentive (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991, pp. 96-97; Black, Cheffins and
Klausner, 2006b).
In the wake of corporate scandals and the great financial crisis, some commentators question the
wisdom of the business judgment rule (Campbell, 2011; Nowicki, 2008; Fairfax, 2005). Jurisdictions
outside the U.S. often recognize the business judgment rule only to a limited extent. German courts,
for instance, seem far less deferential to the business judgment of corporate directors even under
criminal law (as in the “Mannesmann” case, Bundesgerichtshof, 2005; Gevurtz, 2007). German
lawyers sometimes argue that the business judgment rule only precludes strict liability for business
failure but that managers remain accountable for any negligence (Ulmer, 2004). By contrast, our
results counsel to restrict liability to cases where signal precision is high, that is where the court can
be certain that the manager violated the duty of care. One way to translate this into law is that the
applicable standard should be gross negligence or even knowing neglect of due care.
3 The model
Shareholders delegate decision-making to the managers of the corporation. In the following, we refer
to shareholders as the principal and to managers as the agent. The agent has to decide between
a safe option (continuation, business as usual) and a risky one (growth, reorganization). The safe
project yields a certain cash flow r which is normalized to r = 0, while the risky project can either
yield a return R > 0 or a loss L < 0. Ex ante, the probability that the risky project yields the high
cash flow R is p ∈ [0, 1]. The agent can acquire additional information about the profitability of the
risky project. We identify this information with probabilities: If the agent receives information q,
he knows that the posterior probability of the high cash flow R is equal to q. From an uninformed
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perspective, information is distributed according to a distribution function F with p =
´
qdF .
We assume that the principal is risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse. The agent’s (money)
utility function is given by u, which is assumed to be twice differentiable with u′ > 0 and u′′ ≤ 0.
The agent can choose whether to acquire information or not. Acquiring information (e = 1) involves
an effort cost of κ ≥ 0 for the agent, while staying uninformed (e = 0) has no cost. Effort cost and
money utility are additively separable. Whether he learned and what he learned (e ∈ {0, 1} and
q ∈ [0, 1]) is the agent’s private knowledge.
The agent has limited assets: His wealth cannot sink below A ≥ L in any contingency. Moreover,
the agent only accepts the contract if his expected utility is not lower than his reservation utility
u¯ = u(w¯).
First best
The model so far – without liability – is almost identical to the one in Lambert (1986), which the
reader is referred to for a more detailed derivation of the first best solution. In the absence of any
incentive problems, the principal can let the agent stay uninformed and pay him a wage w¯, or make
the agent acquire information and pay him a fixed wage w˜ with u(w˜) = u¯ + κ. It is optimal to
choose the risky project whenever the probability of success is greater than the cut-off
q¯FB =
−L
R− L. (1)
The principal’s payoff if the agent stays uninformed is equal to
max{pR+ (1− p)L, 0} − w¯. (2)
To write down the principal’s payoff if the agent obtains information, we introduce the following
notation:
ρR(q¯) =
ˆ 1
q¯
qdF, (3)
ρL(q¯) =
ˆ 1
q¯
(1− q)dF, (4)
ρ0(q¯) = F (q¯). (5)
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and
S(q¯) = ρR(q¯)R+ ρL(q¯)L. (6)
In the first best, the agent becomes informed if the principal’s maximum payoff is larger than her
payoff in the case without information acquisition:
S(q¯FB)− w˜ ≥ max{pR+ (1− p)L, 0} − w¯. (7)
Contracts
Contracts specify transfers conditional on outcomes, w(x) with x ∈ {L, 0, R}. We sometimes use
the following short-cut notation: wx = w(x) and ux = u(w(x)) for x ∈ {L, 0, R}, and uA = u(A).
By restricting attention to this class of contracts, we adopt an incomplete contracting approach:
There is no communication once the agent has acquired information. This means that there is
no stage in the game at which the agent is informed and can choose from a menu of contracts.
With this assumption we follow the literature on delegated expertise (Lambert 1986, Demski and
Sappington 1987, Gromb and Martimort 2007).2 Another critical assumption is that the contract
cannot condition on the outcome of the risky investment if the agent implements the safe project. In
fact, it would often be exceedingly difficult to determine the forgone profits or losses if the manager
decides not to pursue a risky investment. We make the same assumption for court-imposed liability
(see the next subsection).
Following other contributions (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 2004; Kadan and Swinkels, 2008), we
restrict the range of possible contracts further and focus on two subclasses: (Affine-)linear or sharing
contracts of the form w(x) = β +αx and monotonic, nondecreasing contracts. Linear contracts can
only consist of a fixed salary, a variable salary that is proportional to the firm’s revenue and/or
granting the agent a share in the firm. Monotonic compensation schemes can involve salary, stock,
options and/or bonuses for performance above a certain threshold.
The monotonicity constraint is often imposed in models of moral hazard (Innes, 1990; Matthews,
2001), and for good reason: Non-monotonic contracts are rarely if ever used, presumably because
2Other papers that allow only a single payment rule and no menus include Matthews (2001) and Malcomson
(2009),(2011). Matthews (2001, p.3) argues that “the rarity of menu contracts in reality suggests that they may often
have low benefit or high cost”. Similarly, Raith (2008) assumes that the agent possesses “specific knowledge” about
his productivity that he cannot communicate to the principal.
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rewarding an agent for reduced performance would create problems of ex post moral hazard. For
instance, when a risky investment starts to pay off, the manager might have to sell it at an undervalue
to avoid being penalized for being too successful. By imposing the monotonicity restriction, we show
that our results do not turn on such an implausible compensation scheme. They would, however,
continue to hold without assuming monotonicity.
Courts
The contract uses readily observable information on outcomes. By contrast, whether the agent has
exercised (process or substantive) due care is not obvious and, therefore, has to be determined by
a court. In the main part of the paper, we assume that the agent can only be held to account
if the risky project fails. There is no liability for taking the safe business-as-usual decision even
if the risky project promises a superior expected return. The reason for this assumption is the
following: Courts calculate damages by comparing the actual outcome with a hypothetical outcome
that would have obtained if the agent had exercised due care. With the risky project, the courts
would have to estimate the expected return over various states of the world as the hypothetical
outcome. Courts are reluctant to engage in such guesswork, especially if the risky choice consists of
a specific business strategy that only the firm’s managers can devise. Even if the courts were willing
to consider such claims, their estimate of the damages would be very hard to predict. As a result,
litigation is significantly more attractive to the principal when the risky project has caused a major
loss. Nonetheless, in Section 5 we also consider the case that both the risky and the safe choice can
trigger liability.
During trial, the court receives signals regarding the agent’s behavior. It can try to answer the
following questions: Did the agent obtain enough information? Did he take the correct decision
from an ex ante point of view? As to the first question, the court will seek to establish whether the
agent was sufficiently informed about his decision, that is, whether he exercised process due care.
The court receives a signal ec about the agent’s effort to become informed. Regarding the second
question, the court receives a signal qc about the probability that the risky project has a high return.
A liability rule compares these signals to standards of care e¯c and q¯c. We assume that the court
seeks to promote efficient contracting and applies standards that are optimal for the problem at
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hand, which may well differ from the first best values eFB and qFB.3 We could say equivalently that
the principal herself stipulates the standards in the contract.
Depending on how signals compare with the standards, courts rule that the agent is liable or
not. If the agent is held liable, he has to pay damages to compensate the principal. We assume that
the wealth constraint always binds in this case.4
In the main part of the paper, we focus on liability for substantive due care. We therefore assume
that the court’s signal about effort is a perfect one, ec = e. As a consequence, it is always optimal
to impose process due care liability, with the standard set equal to e¯c = eSB. If ec < e¯c, the agent
is liable; otherwise, the court finds the agent liable if the signal qc is below the standard of care q¯c.
Further, we assume that qc = q + , where  follows a symmetric distribution with mean zero.5
This distribution is denoted by Φ. We assume that Φ is differentiable with density φ > 0 in the
interior of the support. For a given 0 < q¯c < 1, we define
λ(q) = Prob[qc < q¯c|q] = Φ(q¯c − q) (8)
as the probability of being found liable for a violation of substantive due care if the true success
probability is q. The function λ is continuous and decreasing in q, with λ(q¯c) = 12 and λ
′(q) =
−φ(q¯c − q) for all 0 < q < 1. There are two interpretations of the function λ: One is that in
adjudicating substantive due care, the court errs in perceiving the true success probability q or in
applying its standard of care q¯c. The second interpretation is that the agent himself is uncertain
about the true success probability, the court’s ability or the standard of care.
We furthermore define λ(q)=0 for q¯c = 0 and λ(q) = 1 for q¯c = 1. We sometimes single out the
case that q¯c = 0 as a rule of “no liability for substantive due care” and denote it by λnl. A liability
rule that is described by standards e¯c = 1 and q¯c thus translates into the following probabilities of
being liable for the agent: If e = 0, the agent is liable with probability 1. In case that e = 1, his
probability of being liable is equal to λ(q), where λ depends on the standard q¯c and therefore stands
3Since fiduciary duties are designed to promote the shareholder’s interest, it makes sense to assume that the court
maximizes the shareholders’ payoff, which also results in a Pareto efficient allocation.
4This assumption means that if D are the damages, then it must be that wL − D ≤ A, which can be shown to
hold if, for example, D = −L and w¯ ≤ 0.
5Note that we allow qc < 0 and qc > 1. Such signals are treated as 0 and 1, respectively. This yields differentiability
of λe with respect to q, but also means that there is a discontinuity with regard to the standard of care at q¯c = 0
and q¯c = 1. A standard of zero means no liability, but a small but positive standard could be very different from no
liability.
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for a whole family of liability rules.
4 Analysis
The ex post stage: choosing projects
We will first look at the agent’s choice between projects. With a contract w and a liability rule
in place, an informed agent who knows the probability of the good state to be q chooses the risky
project if and only if
quR + (1− q)((1− λ(q))uL + λ(q)uA) ≥ u0. (9)
We assume that if for some probabilities the agent is indifferent between the alternatives, then he
makes the efficient decision.
Lemma 1. There exists a cut-off point q¯(w) with
q¯(w)uR + (1− q¯(w))
(
(1− λ(q¯(w)))uL + λ(q¯(w))uA
)
= u0, (10)
such that the agent chooses the safe project for all q ≤ q¯(w) and the risky project for q > q¯(w).
If there is more than one solution to this equation, then q¯(w) is the one that is closest to q¯FB.
Wherever the contract is clear from the context, we drop the reference to w and write only q¯. The
cut-off in the special case of q¯c = 0 is denoted by q¯nl, i.e.,
q¯nluR + (1− q¯nl)uL = u0. (11)
The analysis of the ex post stage provides a first intuition of how liability can deter efficient risk-
taking. Assuming that the agent simply gets a fixed salary equal to his reservation wage w¯, he is
indifferent between the risky and the safe project and always chooses the one with the higher return.
The cut-off point is q¯nl = q¯FB. But once there is the slightest probability of liability, the safe project
provides a safe harbor against liability and, therefore, strictly dominates the risky project no matter
how valuable the latter. Hence, with a fixed wage no liability (with standards e¯c = 0 and q¯c = 0,
or any standard leading to λ(q¯FB) = 0) is optimal. The effort dimension plays no role as it is not
possible to induce information acquisition with a fixed wage.
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Of course, agents often get paid for performance. In the following, we study how incentive
pay affects the agent’s choice under the threat of liability. We start with the special case of linear
compensation schemes.
Lemma 2. For every linear contract w(x) = β + αx with α ≤ A−βL , it holds that q¯(w) ≥ q¯FB. In
addition, for any two contracts w(x) = β + αx and wˆ(x) = βˆ + αx with 0 ≤ β − βˆ ≤ λ(q¯(w))(1 −
q¯(w))(β −A+ αL), it holds that q¯(w) ≥ q¯nl(wˆ).
This lemma says that with a linear contract for which the limited liability constraint does not
bind, there is underinvestment in the risky project. The intuition is simple: With a linear contract
and no liability, a risk-neutral agent chooses the first best cut-off, while a risk-averse agent will at the
first best cut-off still prefer the safe project. Liability only makes the risky project less attractive.
Indeed, as the lemma also shows, the agent will be more inclined to take risk if he is relieved of
substantive due care liability.
While risk aversion thus limits the set of decision thresholds that can be implemented under a
linear contract, under a more general contract all decision thresholds q¯ ∈ [0, 1] can be implemented.
In the following, we consider incentives to acquire information and solve the full optimization problem
for both classes of contracts.
The ex ante stage: choosing effort
Every wage scheme w together with the liability rule described by λ induces an effort level e(w) ∈
{0, 1} and a decision threshold q¯(w) ∈ [0, 1]. We can interpret e and q¯ as part of the contract. It
may be optimal to implement no information acquisition at all, i.e. eSB = 0. This can be done with
a contract w(x) = w¯. Because we assume that the agent makes the efficient choice whenever he is
indifferent, there is no need for substantive due care liability, hence q¯c = 0 is optimal.
Thus, the interesting case is that the optimal contract requires the agent to collect information.
We write an informed agent’s utility who faces contract w and decides according to threshold q¯ as
U(w, q¯) = ρR(q¯)uR + ρL(q¯)uL − ρλ(q¯)(uL − uA) + ρ0(q¯)u0 − κ, (12)
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where
ρλ(q¯) =
ˆ 1
q¯
(1− q)λ(q)dF. (13)
In the following, we will derive the constraints that a contract w with e = 1 and decision threshold
q¯ has to satisfy. First, q¯ must be the cut-off above which the agent chooses the risky project:
q¯uR + (1− q¯)((1− λ(q¯))uL + λ(q¯)uA) = u0. (D)
The contract also has to make sure that the agent prefers acquiring information to just choosing the
safe project:
U(w, q¯) ≥ u0. (SIC)
Similarly, the agent should prefer acquiring information to just choosing the risky project:
U(w, q¯) ≥ puR + (1− p)uA. (RIC)
In addition to these two incentive compatibility constraints, we have the participation constraint
U(w, q¯) ≥ u¯, (PC)
and the limited liability constraint
wL ≥ A. (LL)
Finally, there is either the monotonicity constraint
wR ≥ w0 ≥ wL, (MON)
or the stronger linearity constraint
wx = β + αx. (LIN)
The principal maximizes her payoff
pi(w, q¯) = S(q¯)− ρR(q¯)wR − ρL(q¯)wL + ρλ(q¯)(wL −A)− ρ0w0 (14)
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subject to the constraints (D), (SIC), (RIC), (PC), (LL) and (MON) or (LIN), respectively.
Linear contracts
We start again with the analysis of linear contracts.
Proposition 1. If contracts are linear, the optimal standard q¯c is equal to zero.
If contracts are linear there should be no liability for making wrong judgments, only for careless
preparation of the decision. The intuition behind this result is the following. We have shown in
Lemma 2 that with a linear contract, the agent chooses the risky project only if the probability of
success of the risky project is relatively large, larger than the first best cut-off q¯FB. The contract
thus has to induce more risk taking and – as we have also shown in Lemma 2 – that is what less
liability achieves. An optimal liability rule therefore holds the agent liable with probability zero.
Non-decreasing contracts
Linear contracts are not optimal in this setting. If the principal can freely specify compensation for
each contingency, she can offer extra rewards for pursuing the risky project. In fact, with liability
the principal could even want to pay more for suffering losses from the risky project than for the safe
return. By setting wL > w0 or even wL > wR, she may be able to mitigate the risk-deterrent effect
of liability. Consequently, the monotonicity constraint may be binding once it becomes optimal to
impose substantive due care liability. Remember that we include the monotonicity constraint to
rule out compensation schemes that are barely observed in reality. The following results hold even
without this additional restriction.
Proposition 2. Consider the problem of implementing a given q¯ at minimum cost. In the optimum,
(SIC) is always binding if (LL) is not binding. Let the optimal contract be denoted by wλ, and the
optimal contract without liability by wnl. Then the following comparisons hold:6
wnlR ≥ wλR and wλL ≥ wnlL . (15)
Proposition 2 states that imposing substantive due care liability compresses the optimal com-
pensation scheme. This result may seem counterintuitive as the contract has to work against the
6Note that if the optimal standard is equal to zero, then we have the special case that wnl = wλ.
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Figure 1: The left panel shows the function λ(q) for the case of a normally distributed error term
for different levels of precision ∆. A perfect signal would be represented by a step function with a
jump at q¯c = 0.8. The right panel shows λ(q) for the case of a uniformly distributed error term,
again for different levels of precision.
agent’s increased incentive to avoid risk. Yet liability also increases the value of making an informed
decision and in this regard substitutes for performance-based compensation. Proposition 2 shows
that the latter effect always prevails if the optimal standard of care is positive. Intuitively, imposing
substantive due care liability can only be optimal if the compressed wage scheme saves the principal
more than she has to spend on compensating the agent for the liability risk when he chooses the
risky project.
How the standard of substantive due care should be set depends on the precision of the court’s
signal qc. To measure the impact of precision, we assume that the signal qc = q +  follows a
distribution that depends on a parameter ∆, where a larger ∆ means greater precision. What is
meant by precision is illustrated in Figure 1. There we show the function λ for a normal and a
uniform error term, i.e. we consider the case that  follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance 1/∆ as well as the case that  follows a uniform distribution with
Φ() = min{1,max{0, (1 + ∆)/2}}. (16)
For ∆→∞ the case of a perfect signal, qc = q, is approached, while for ∆→ 0 the signal becomes
perfectly uninformative, i.e., λ(q) = 1/2 independent of q. We require that λ depends on ∆ in a
differentiable way and such that the functions cross only at a single point. We therefore make the
following technical assumption.
Assumption 1. The function Φ is differentiable with respect to ∆ for all  in the interior of the
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support, with ∂λ(q)∂∆ ≥ 0 for q ≤ q¯c and ∂λ(q)∂∆ ≤ 0 for q ≥ q¯c. Moreover we assume that for the inverse
function λ−1 : (0, 1)→ R it holds that the derivative of λ−1 is weakly increasing in ∆.
The last condition can be illustrated as follows using Figure 1: Imagine a horizontal line through
any point below 0.5 on the vertical axis. The line is intersected by liability functions for different
values of ∆, where functions that correspond to a larger ∆ intersect the line more to the left. The
assumption says that as one moves from left to right along this line, the slope of the liability functions
that intersect the line becomes flatter. Similarly, if one draws a horizontal line through any point
above 0.5 on the vertical axis, then if one moves from left to right along this line, the slope of the
liability functions that intersect the line becomes steeper.
Remark 1. Assumption 1 holds for the normal and the uniform error terms.
That this remark is true is quite intuitive from Figure 1. Nevertheless, we provide a formal proof
in the appendix.
We can now state the main result of this section.
Proposition 3. There exists a cut-off ∆¯ such that the optimal standard is equal to zero if ∆ < ∆¯,
while it is positive if ∆ ≥ ∆¯.
Basically, the trade-off between no liability and liability is between insurance for agents who learn
a high q and agents who learn a lower q. If ρλ(q¯) and λ(q¯) could be set separately, the principal would
maximize λ(q¯) to punish uninformed decisions and minimize ρλ(q¯) because a large ρλ(q¯) exposes the
agent to risk that he has to be compensated for. A perfect signal, which essentially sets ρλ(q¯) equal
to zero and λ(q¯) equal to one, is always beneficial. If the signal is not perfect but still very precise,
a large λ(q¯) can punish risk taking with success probabilities closely below q¯ without punishing risk
taking with larger success probabilities too much. When the signal becomes very imprecise, then
exposing the agent to liability risk for values close to q¯ implies also exposing him to risk for larger
values of q.
Discussion
Proposition 3 enshrines the economic rationale of the business judgment rule. It militates against
substantive due care liability if the courts commit too many mistakes in evaluating business decisions
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or, equivalently, if agents misjudge what courts require. A complementary interpretation is that
signal precision varies over cases. While the courts may be able to assess some business decisions,
others present “hard cases” with a high probability of error. In this reading, Proposition 3 implies
that liability should be confined to straightforward cases of evident mismanagement.
The business judgment rule thus can be a response to the difficulty and error-proneness of
evaluating business decisions in the courtroom (“judges are not business experts”). The model also
captures other considerations advanced by legal commentators: With a noisy signal, performance
pay becomes comparatively more efficient in incentivizing the agent (the alternative-mechanisms
argument).7 If the courts raised the standard of care beyond the optimum, the principal would
adjust the compensation scheme to counteract the risk-deterrent effect of liability. Hiring and
incentivizing an agent would become more expensive (the higher-compensation argument). Without
an adjustment, the agent would be less inclined to choose the risky project, even if it is worthwhile
(the risk-deterrence argument).
We can also take up the concern about a potential hindsight bias. It is often said that even
experts or professional judges overestimate the ex ante probability of an outcome that they observe
ex post. Let q¯c denote the optimal standard (without hindsight bias). Assume that there is a
hindsight bias of the form that if the court observes signal qc, it actually sees the signal qc − h, for
some q¯c > h > 0. With a bias, the probability of being liable from the agent’s perspective is equal
to λ(q) = Prob[qc − h ≤ q¯c|q] = Prob[qc ≤ q¯c + h|q]. The optimal standard is now q¯c − h, which is
weakly decreasing in the size of the hindsight bias h. If courts cannot overcome the hindsight bias,
the optimal standard should reflect the bias and be lower. However, the prevalence and extent of
the bias are subject to debate.8 Also, it is not clear how judges would apply a standard that aims
at correcting their average hindsight bias.
In our model, the agent is exposed to risk from compensation and liability in order to induce him
to become informed. The lower the agent’s cost of effort κ, the less risk is needed. In the extreme
case that κ → 0, a wage of slightly more than w¯ can almost achieve the first best. Introducing
liability would only introduce unnecessary and costly risk.
7Remember, however, that liability can only be desirable if there is a non-linear compensation scheme and in this
sense the two act as complementary mechanisms.
8In a recent study, Rachlinski, Wistrich and Guthrie (2011) find that court rulings on the legality of searches in
criminal proceedings do not vary between foresight and hindsight.
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Figure 2: With precision (∆) measured on the horizontal axis, this graph shows the optimal q¯c in
dependence on ∆ for the following example: u(w) =
√
w, κ = 1, u¯ = 20, A = L = 0, R = 1000,
r = 700, q and  follow uniform distributions. The function is increasing and always below the first
best cut-off q¯FB = 0.7 (even as ∆→∞, the optimal standard does not approach the first best).
Remark 2. If κ is sufficiently low, then the optimal standard is equal to zero.
This finding has immediate policy implications. Certain agents make far-reaching decisions but
at relatively little personal cost in terms of time and labor. An example are outside directors
on corporate boards. While their responsibility is to monitor the corporate officers and to ratify
important decisions, they do so based on information provided by the corporate officers, accountants
etc. Their own effort is limited to several board meetings per year.9 Remark 2 counsels to eliminate
substantive due care liability in this setting. In fact, the law appears to be especially lenient towards
outside directors (Black, Cheffins and Klausner, 2006a). To the extent that outside directors receive
only a fixed wage or stock, our result for linear contracts leads to the same conclusion. In a similar
vein, agents in charity and other pro bono activities should not be subject to liability if their decisions
involve risky choices.
For agents with significant effort cost and a convex compensation scheme, the implications are
less straightforward. Proposition 3 implies that beyond a certain level of noise in the court’s signal,
the agent should not face substantive due care liability. While we cannot show in general that the
optimal standard is decreasing as the signal becomes noisier, Figure 2 shows a typical example, in
which this is the case.
It is sometimes argued that a limit on damages borne by the agent can render liability less
9In the taxonomy of Fama and Jensen (1983), outside directors exercise “decision control” while “decision manage-
ment” is vested in the executive directors and officers.
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harmful and indeed desirable. In fact, if one can set an appropriate cap for damages (i.e., if A is
chosen rather than determined by the agent’s wealth), even a very noisy signal can be used. Turning
this result into policy advice is difficult though. The court would have to adjust the damage cap
to the difficulty of adjudicating the case (or, similarly, the severity of the agent’s fault) as well as
to the agent’s private wealth and risk aversion. While conceivable, this is not what courts usually
do in private law litigation. In principle, one could also devise a D&O insurance with a variable
deductible reflecting the noise in the court’s signal.10
5 No safe haven
The basic model presumes that the agent is never liable for taking the safe path of “business as
usual.” This assumption is plausible when liability for the safe choice would require the court to
compare the actual outcome to a hypothetical decision with a broad range of possible consequences.
Sometimes, however, the implications of taking the risky decision can be observed quite well. For
instance, in a takeover the safe choice on behalf of shareholders consists of selling the firm for cash
(as happened in the famous Smith v. Van Gorkom case, Supreme Court of Delaware, 1985). But
because the firm often continues to operate after the takeover, there is an indication of how the
shareholders would have fared with keeping the firm. In such a setting, courts can use the observed
outcome to calculate damages.
To study this possibility, we assume in this section that the outcome of the risky project is
observable ex post. What if the principal can (and will) sue, not just in the case of a large loss,
but whenever the performance could have been better? If the risky project would have yielded the
superior return and the agent is found liable for pursuing the safe project instead, damages amount
to d = R; but as before, we assume that the limited liability constraint is binding. Again, the agent
is always liable if he fails to become informed (and his project performs poorly). Therefore, for an
uninformed agent the expected payoff from the safe choice is (1− p)u0 + puA.
If the agent has observed process due care, the court evaluates the substantive merit of his
decision. In principle, the court could apply the same standard q¯c to impose liability for taking the
10To protect the agent, the insurance would have to cover any damages exceeding the deductible. In such a setting,
moral hazard would become a serious concern if liability were imposed in spite of a noisy signal (i.e., for minor
mistakes).
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risky and the safe decision. When the agent pursues the safe project, he is held liable if qc > q¯c;
his expected payoff would be u0 − q(1 − λ(q))(u0 − uA). However, using the same standard would
prevent the court from adapting the standard to a noisy signal because relaxing it for the safe choice
would imply a tightening for the risky choice (and conversely). Alternatively, two different standards
can be used: The court can infer “too much risk-taking” from qc < q¯c and “too little risk-taking”
from qc > q¯c0, with q¯c0 > q¯c. We take some function l(q) to measure an informed agent’s expected
probability of being liable after choosing the safe project. The court can influence this function by
setting a standard q¯c0. The function that we have in mind is l(q) = qΦ(q − q¯c0), but it can be any
other function that decreases in the standard q¯c0 and is differentiable for 0 < q < 1 and 0 < q¯c0 < 1.
It should be noted that the agent’s decision is still monotone in q: if he prefers the risky project for
q¯, then he does so for all q ≥ q¯.
Proposition 4. In the setting without a safe haven, the optimal standard q¯c0 is equal to one. If F
is the uniform distribution, then q¯c is equal to zero.
An informed agent should never be held liable for taking the safe choice. The reason is that the
cheapest way to restrain the agent’s inclination towards the safe project is to reduce compensation
w0 in that contingency. True, liability uses more information, namely the court’s signal qc and the
hypothetical outcome of the risky project. But this time the information cannot be used to reduce
risk: While liability for wrongfully taking the risky choice substitutes for variation in compensation
between wL and wR, there is no such effect for the safe choice.
Without a safe haven, liability sometimes becomes inefficient for the risky choice as well. Even
the first best can be implemented in some cases now. At first blush, eliminating the safe haven
offers the best of both worlds: optimal outcomes without imposing liability. One must keep in mind
though that Proposition 4 only concerns liability for substantive due care. The result very much
depends on the fact that – in contrast to the basic model – liability for process due care now applies
to both the safe and the risky choice. Because we still assume that the court observes the agent’s
effort perfectly, inducing him to become informed requires no exposure to risk. In the next section,
we examine how much our results depend on this assumption.
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6 Robustness: uncertainty in the effort dimension
So far, we have assumed that the court’s signal ec about the agent’s effort to acquire information
is perfectly precise. This allowed us to neglect the effort dimension throughout the analysis. A
natural question to ask is what happens if we relax this assumption. Does the gist of our analysis
hold up if courts commit mistakes in assessing the agent’s procedural care? Judging the proper
decision-making process can be difficult: Whether more information would have been needed rises
similar questions as the validity of the decision. Also, courts may find it hard to distinguish genuine
diligence in preparing the decision from a pretense of gathering relevant information that only serves
to shield the agent against liability.
To model noise in the court’s assessment of procedural care, we introduce a distribution function
Ψe, e ∈ {0, 1} for the noisy signal ec and a standard e¯c ∈ [0, 1] for process due care. Important are
the following two probabilities:
Ψ0(e¯
c) = Prob[ec < e¯c|e = 0]) and Ψ1(e¯c) = Prob[ec < e¯c|e = 1]. (17)
The court can influence these two probabilities by setting the standard. Again, a standard e¯c = 0
means no liability in the effort dimension.
Proposition 5. If there exists a standard of care e¯c = e˜ such that Ψ1(e˜) = 0 and at the same time
Ψ0(e˜) ≥ pκ
(u¯− uA)
´ 1
p (q − p)dF
, (18)
then our results still hold: The standards q¯c = 0 and e¯c = min{eSB, e˜} are optimal if contracts are
linear (Proposition 1), if contracts are monotone and ∆ ≤ ∆¯(Proposition 3) and if q is uniformly
distributed in the setting without a safe haven (Proposition 4); imposing an optimal standard q¯c > 0
compresses the compensation scheme as before (Proposition 2).
Proposition 5 essentially states that as long as the signal about effort is sufficiently precise, our
earlier results remain unaffected; the process due care standard should be such that an informed
agent is never held liable. The basic idea is that process due care only matters because it penalizes
uninformed risk-taking and thereby relaxes the risky choice incentive constraint (RIC). With a
20
precise signal, one can ensure that (RIC) does not bind and still relieve the agent of liability risk if
he becomes informed. In this case, liability for process due care only confers benefits. With (RIC)
out of the way, the analysis becomes the same as with a perfect signal on effort. Therefore, our
earlier results are confirmed.
A standard e˜ as in the proposition only exists if the signal ec is sufficiently precise. Note that
the standard can only be set at e¯c = 1 if the signal is perfect. As the signal becomes less precise, the
standard has to decrease. Yet Ψ0(e˜) must remain sufficiently large as required by condition (18).
Condition (18) is easier to satisfy the lower p and κ and the larger u¯− uA. A low p implies that
the risky project is less attractive from an uninformed perspective and (RIC) is therefore less likely
to bind. With a low κ, the contract can be relatively flat, which again makes (RIC) less likely to
bind. Finally, a large u¯ − uA implies that being held liable hurts the agent a lot; the probability
Ψ0(e˜) can then be lower.
It should also be noted that Proposition 5 provides only a sufficient condition. There are large
parameter regions for which our results also continue to hold. In fact, liability for neither process
nor substantive due care should be imposed in certain cases such as the one set out in the following
corollary:
Corollary 1. If q¯FB ≥ p, then standards q¯c = 0 and e¯c = 0 are optimal if contracts are linear and
if ∆ ≤ ∆¯.
7 Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical argument for why courts in the U.S. routinely abstain from imposing
liability for poor business judgment. Shareholders want managers to take risks, but also to be
diligent and careful in pursuing risky projects. Following the legal analysis applied by the courts,
we distinguish liability for lack of effort in preparing a risk-taking decision (process due care) and
liability for the decision itself (substantive due care). Our key insight is the following: As long
as the courts administer liability in the effort dimension reasonably well, they should be reluctant
to second-guess managerial decisions. This prescription applies if compensation relates linearly to
performance, if liability can also be imposed for failure to take risk or, most importantly, if courts
(or managers) often err in evaluating business decisions.
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Our model has direct policy implications. Outside directors on corporate boards often receive
only a flat salary or shares in the corporation. The result for linear contracts suggests that they
should not be subject to substantive due care liability. The same is evidently true for pro bono
directors in charitable organizations.
For corporate managers with a non-linear, convex compensation scheme, policy advice is less
clear-cut: Courts should refrain from imposing liability if they commit too many mistakes in adjudi-
cating the ex ante validity of business decisions, or if it is hard for managers to anticipate the court’s
ruling. The sweeping business judgment rule in the U.S. suggests that courts have little confidence
in their ability to review and guide management decisions. This view is even more appealing if
litigation costs are taken into account. However, one could also be more optimistic. Perhaps spe-
cialized courts can handle even difficult business cases in a sophisticated and predictable manner.
With such expert courts, substantive due care liability could be efficient. Ultimately, the case for or
against the business judgment rule must be made on empirical grounds.
We motivated our analysis with the example of corporate directors and officers. However, the
model carries over to other settings in which an agent makes risky decisions on behalf of a principal.
Asset managers are a case in point. To invest the capital of their clients, they continuously choose
among projects with different risk-reward profiles. Our analysis suggests that exposing an asset
manager to substantive due care liability can be costly for the client, especially if the asset manager
can pay relatively large damage awards. Isolating the agent from liability for his decisions – granting
him discretion – can be efficient in this agency relation as well as in many others, such as for business
consultants or attorneys. Discretion is, in this sense, a general feature of the law of agency.
In our model, the interests of the agent and the principal diverge with regard to the effort in
decision-making, not to the decision itself. The problem only arises because incentivizing the agent
can distort his decision: He can avoid having to exert effort (and liability for failure to take effort)
by choosing the safe project. Liability in the decision dimension reduces the cost of inducing the
agent to take profitable risks – if it is used at all. The analysis changes fundamentally if a conflict
of interest arises with regard to the decision. For instance, the agent may obtain a private benefit
from choosing the risky project. As the agent strictly prefers the risky choice even in the absence
of any incentive contract, there can be a greater role for liability in the decision dimension. In legal
terms, this case calls up the agent’s “duty of loyalty,” to which the business judgment rule does not
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apply. We leave an inquiry of the duty of loyalty to future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. A q¯ satisfying (10) exists, since for q = 1 the agent’s payoff from the risky
project is equal to uR ≥ u0 and for q = 0 it is equal to (1 − λ(0))uL + λ(0)uA ≤ u0. Note that
these inequalities would hold in every optimal contract and not just because of the monotonicity
constraint. We show first that for all q < q¯, the agent prefers the safe project. Because uR ≥ u0, it
must be true that
(1− λ(q¯))uL + λ(q¯)uA ≤ u0. (19)
Because λ is a weakly decreasing function, for q < q¯ it holds that
(1− λ(q))uL + λ(q)uA ≤ (1− λ(q¯))uL + λ(q¯)uA. (20)
It then also follows that
quR + (1− q)
(
(1− λ(q))uL + λ(q)uA
) ≤ u0. (21)
Next, we show that for all q > q¯ the agent prefers the risky project. It holds that
(1− λ(q))uL + λ(q)uA ≥ (1− λ(q¯))uL + λ(q¯)uA, (22)
such that if (1− λ(q))uL + λ(q)uA ≤ u0 we again have that
quR + (1− q)
(
(1− λ(q))uL + λ(q)uA
) ≥ u0, (23)
because there is more weight on the larger of the two payoffs. If instead (1−λ(q))uL+λ(q)uA ≥ u0,
the inequality holds as well. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The first claim is a direct consequence of risk aversion. With a linear
contract, the expected wage (without liability) from the risky project at q < q¯FB is β+α(qR+ (1−
q)L) < β. Hence, the agent chooses the safe project even if he is risk-neutral and λ(q) = 0. Liability
and risk aversion will only distort the agent’s choice towards the safe choice.
For the proof of the second claim, we define l = β + αL − A ≥ 0. We will show that for the
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probability q¯ at which
u(β) = q¯u(β + αR) + (1− q¯)((1− λ(q¯))u(β + αL) + λ(q¯)uA), (24)
the agent also prefers the risky to the safe project with no liability and the contract wˆ, i.e.,
u(βˆ) ≤ q¯u(βˆ + αR) + (1− q¯)u(βˆ + αL). (25)
The intuition behind this result is that the agent would be willing to pay at least (1− q¯)λ(q¯)l to be
insured against the additional lottery to lose l with probability λ(q¯) in the event of failure. Insurance
against the additional risk of liability makes the lottery more attractive. The result can be proved
by first noting that, due to concavity of u,
u(βˆ) ≤ u(β)− (β − βˆ)u′(β). (26)
Using (24), we can conclude that
u(βˆ) ≤ q¯u(β + αR) + (1− q¯)u(β + αL− λ(q¯)l)− (β − βˆ)u′(β). (27)
With reasoning as before, we get
u(βˆ) ≤ q¯u(βˆ + αR) + (1− q¯)u(β + αL− λ(q¯)l) + (β − βˆ)(q¯u′(βˆ + αR)− u′(β)) (28)
and from this
u(βˆ) ≤ q¯u(βˆ + αR) + (1− q¯)u(βˆ + αL)− λ(q¯)(1− q¯)lu′(βˆ + αL) (29)
+(β − βˆ)(q¯u′(βˆ + αR) + (1− q¯)u′(βˆ + αL)− u′(β)).
Because 0 ≤ β − βˆ ≤ (1− q¯)λ(q¯)l the claim holds. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Take any liability rule with probability of being found liable λ and
let w(x) = β + αx be the principal’s optimal contract under this rule. The resulting threshold for
risk-taking is denoted by q¯. If the agent reacts to this contract by staying uninformed, the principal
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can get a weakly better outcome under no liability simply by setting a fixed wage w¯. We are therefore
concerned with the case that contract and liability rule lead to information acquisition. We first
discuss the case that α ≥ AL , which means that uL = uA. In this case, the rule λ is not distinguishable
from strict liability, as the agent is already at the lower bound with the contractually specified wage.
The same outcome can be replicated under no liability, which must therefore be weakly better.
Next, we consider the more interesting case that the wealth constraint only binds if the agent is
held liable. We define l = β + αL−A ≥ 0 and a contract wˆ = βˆ + αˆx by
αˆ = α and βˆ = β − lρλ. (30)
We will show that by offering this contract and excluding liability, the principal gets a higher payoff
than under the liability rule. First, because
β − βˆ = l
ˆ 1
q¯
(1− q)λ(q)dF ≤ l(1− q¯)λ(q¯), (31)
we can apply Lemma 2 and get
q¯FB ≤ q¯nl(wˆ) ≤ q¯. (32)
Next we will show that the agent’s payoff is weakly higher under no substantive due care liability
and corresponding contract wˆ. As the first step, we show that
Unl(wˆ, q¯) ≥ Uλ(w, q¯), (33)
where Unl denotes the agent’s expected payoff with no liability and Uλ denotes the agent’s expected
payoff under liability rule λ. These payoffs are the expected utilities of two lotteries. We denote
the distribution function of the lottery induced by wˆ and no liability by Gnl and the distribution
function of the lottery induced by w and λ by Gλ. Figure 3 shows these distribution functions.
We use this figure to show that Gnl second order stochastically dominates Gλ. First note that
the two lotteries have the same expected value. For second-order stochastic dominance we have to
show that for all w ˆ w
A
Gλ(x)−Gnl(x)dx ≥ 0. (34)
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Figure 3: The (red) dashed line is the distribution function Gnl and the other line is the distribution
function Gλ.
Figure 3 shows that this reduces to
ˆ β+αR
A
Gλ(x)−Gnl(x)dx ≥ 0, (35)
and that this integral is equal to ρλl − (β − βˆ), which is equal to zero. As the second step, we
conclude that the agent’s actual utility under no substantive due care liability must be even larger
if he can choose the optimal q¯nl(wˆ) instead of q¯:
Unl(wˆ, q¯nl(wˆ)) ≥ Unl(wˆ, q¯) ≥ Uλ(w, q¯). (36)
Knowing that the agent’s utility is weakly greater under no liability immediately gives us the par-
ticipation constraint (PC). Because βˆ ≤ β, we also have the safe-choice incentive constraint (SIC).
Similarly, the risky-choice incentive constraint (RIC) holds because βˆ + αR ≤ β + αR. Finally, the
principal’s payoff under no liability is larger than the principal’s payoff under the rule described by
λ :
pinl(wˆ, q¯nl) = (1− α)S(q¯nl)− βˆ ≥ (1− α)S(q¯) + ρλl − β = piλ(w, q¯). (37)

Proof of Proposition 2.
In the following, we study the problem of implementing a given q¯ at minimum cost under the
assumption that the limited liability constraint is not binding (if it is binding then wλ = wnl and the
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proposition holds). We find this lowest cost C(q¯) by minimizing the expected wage payment subject
to the constraints (D), (SIC), (RIC), (PC) and (MON). First, we hold q¯c fixed and minimize only
with respect to the wages. The Lagrangian for this problem is
minwL,w0,wR ρRwR + ρLwL − ρλ(wL −A) + ρ0w0 (38)
+µ1(q¯uR + (1− q¯)((1− λ(q¯))uL + λ(q¯)uA)− u0)
+µ2(ρRuR + ρLuL − ρλ(uL − uA) + ρ0u0 − κ− u0)
+µ3(ρRuR + ρLuL − ρλ(uL − uA) + ρ0u0 − κ− puR − (1− p)uA)
+µ4(ρRuR + ρLuL − ρλ(uL − uA) + ρ0u0 − κ− u¯)
+µ5(u0 − uL)
It holds that µi ≥ 0 for i = 2, 3, 4, 5, but we cannot yet conclude the sign of µ1. This optimization
problem is well-behaved with concave constraint functions and a linear objective function. In any
optimum, the following first order conditions with respect to w0, wR, and wL have to hold:
1
u′(w0)
= − 1
ρ0
µ1 +
(ρ0 − 1)
ρ0
µ2 + µ3 + µ4 +
µ5
ρ0
(39)
1
u′(wR)
=
q¯
ρR
µ1 + µ2 +
(ρR − p)
ρR
µ3 + µ4 (40)
1
u′(wL)
=
(1− q¯)(1− λ(q¯))
(ρL − ρλ) µ1 + µ2 + µ3 + µ4 −
µ5
ρL − ρ0 (41)
with the usual complementary slackness conditions. Using these necessary conditions we can prove
that in any optimum it holds that
µ4 + µ3 + µ2 ≥ 1
u′(wL)
. (42)
This follows from (41) if µ1 ≤ 0. If µ1 > 0 and µ5 = 0 it follows from the first condition (39), and
if µ1 > 0 and µ5 > 0 (which implies w0 = wL), it follows from (39) and (41), which together yield
1
u′(wL)
=
(1− q¯)(1− λ(q¯))− 1
(ρL − ρλ + ρ0) µ1 + µ2(1−
1
(ρL − ρλ + ρ0)) + µ3 + µ4. (43)
We can immediately determine the sign of µ1 if (MON) is not binding (µ5 = 0). In this case it must
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be true that µ1 < 0, because else wL would be larger than w0. This in turn implies that µ2 > 0,
because else w0 would be larger than wR. The optimal contract w is then defined as the solution to
the equations (D), (SIC), (PC) or (D), (SIC), (RIC).
If (MON) is binding (w0 = wL), then the first order conditions are
1
u′(wR)
=
q¯
ρR
µ1 + µ2 +
(ρR − E[q])
ρR
µ3 + µ4 (44)
1
u′(wL)
=
(1− q¯)(1− λ(q¯))− 1
ρL − ρλ + ρ0 µ1 + µ2(1−
1
(ρL − ρλ + ρ0)) + µ3 + µ4 (45)
It can be seen that if µ1 < 0, it must hold that µ2 > 0 (because else wR would be smaller than wL).
Therefore, µ1 < 0 implies that (MON),(D),(SIC) are binding.
In the following, we solve the problem of choosing q¯c ∈ (0, 1) optimally. The objective function
and the constraints are differentiable in q¯c for all q¯c ∈ (0, 1).11 If an interior optimum q¯c ∈ (0, 1)
exists, then it must hold there that
−∂ρλ
∂q¯c
(wL −A) + (µ4 + µ3 + µ2)(uL − uA)∂ρλ
∂q¯c
+ µ1(1− q¯)∂λ(q¯)
∂q¯c
(uL − uA) = 0. (46)
We know that ∂ρλ∂q¯c ≥ 0 and ∂λ(q¯)∂q¯c ≥ 0. Because
(µ4 + µ3 + µ2) ≥ 1
u′(wL)
≥ wL −A
uL − uA (47)
the first two terms in (46) add up to something positive. We can therefore conclude that µ1 < 0
(which we knew for the case that (MON) is not binding, and now follows also for the case that
(MON) is binding, which can only be true for a positive standard). This also implies that (SIC)
is always binding.
We can exploit that (SIC) and (D) are binding to compare the optimal contract w to the optimal
contract wnl for q¯c = 0. From (SIC) and (D) we can derive that
unlL = u
nl
0 − u0 + (1− x)uL + xuA, (48)
11It is also straightforward to show that a regularity condition holds such that we indeed identify necessary conditions
for an optimum. One can also show that for q¯c → 0 and q¯c →1, the cost converges against something that is strictly
larger than the cost attained with q¯c = 0 and wnl.
29
where
x =
´
q¯(1− q¯)λ(q¯)q − (1− q)λ(q)q¯dF´
q¯(q − q¯)dF
. (49)
Assume first that unl0 ≤ u0, which implies unlL ≤ (1−x)uL+xuA. Since it holds that ρλρL ≤ λ(q¯) ≤ x,
this in turn implies that unlL ≤ (1− ρλρL )uL +
ρλ
ρL
uA, i.e wnlL ≤ (1− ρλρL )wL +
ρλ
ρL
A. We also know that
w¯ ≤ w0, so that if it were true that wnlR ≤ wR we would have
ρRwR + ρL
(
(1− ρλ
ρL
)w0 +
ρλ
ρL
A
)
+ ρ0w0 ≥ ρRwnlR + ρLwnlL + ρ0wnl0 , (50)
which means that a standard of zero is actually optimal. Hence, it must hold that wnlR ≥ wR if the
contract w is optimal.
Assume now unl0 > u0. This can only be the case if for no liability (RIC) is binding. Hence we
know that
punlR + (1− p)uA = unl0 > u0 ≥ puR + (1− p)uA, (51)
and therefore unlR > uR. (D) and (RIC) together yield
unlR
ˆ q¯
0
(q¯ − q)dF + (ρL + ρ0(1− q¯))unlL = κ+ (1− p)uA (52)
and
uR
ˆ q¯
0
(q¯ − q)dF + (ρL + ρ0(1− q¯))uL − (ρλ + ρ0(1− q¯)λ(q¯))(uL − uA) ≥ κ+ (1− p)uA. (53)
We can conclude that
(uR − unlR )
ˆ q¯
0
(q¯ − q)dF + (ρL + ρ0(1− q¯))(uL − unlL )− (ρλ + ρ0(1− q¯)λ(q¯))(uL − uA) ≥ 0, (54)
hence uL ≥ unlL .

Proof of Remark 1. We have to show that in these two cases ∂∂∆∂λλ
−1(λ) ≥ 0. With φ = Φ′,
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the derivative of the function λ−1(λ) = q¯c − Φ−1(λ) is
λ−1′(λ) = − 1
φ(Φ−1(λ))
. (55)
We have to show that this expression is increasing in ∆. To this end, we take the derivative with
respect to ∆ of the function φ(Φ−1(λ)). If we can show that this is positive in the two cases, we are
done. In general, this derivative is equal to
dφ(Φ−1(λ))
d∆
=
∂φ
∂∆
− φ
′ ∂Φ
∂∆
φ
∣∣∣∣
Φ−1(λ)
. (56)
For the linear error term with distribution Φ() = 1+∆2 on the interval [− 1∆ , 1∆ ] the second term is
zero so that this derivative is
∂φ(Φ−1(λ))
∂∆
=
1
2
> 0. (57)
For the normal error term with distribution Φ() =
√
∆
2pi
´ 
−∞ e
− 1
2
x2∆dx we can compute
∂φ()
∂∆
= (
1
∆
− 2)1
2
φ(), (58)
φ′()
φ()
= −∆, (59)
and, using integration by parts,
∂Φ()
∂∆
=
1
2∆
φ(). (60)
Putting everything together, we get
∂φ(Φ−1(λ)))
∂∆
=
1
2∆
φ(Φ−1(λ)) > 0. (61)

Proof of Proposition 3.
Note that if the standard is set to zero, the optimal contract wnl and the principal’s payoff
pinl(wnl, q¯nl) do not depend on ∆.
In a first step, we show that as the signal becomes more precise, eventually a positive standard
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must be better. We show that with a perfect signal, the same threshold as under no liability, q¯nl,
can be implemented at lower cost. To this end, we set the legal standard q¯c = q¯nl and consider a
contract with w0 = wL = wnl0 and wR defined by
ρR(q¯
nl)(uR − unl0 ) = κ. (62)
For the so defined contract it holds that wnlR ≥ wR and wL ≥ wnlL . In the limit ∆ → ∞, with a
perfect signal, this contract implements q¯nl because
q¯nluR + (1− q¯nl)uA ≤ u0 and q¯nluR + (1− q¯nl)u0 ≥ u0. (63)
It exposes the agent to a lottery between wnl0 (with probability ρL+ρ0) and wR (with probability ρR).
The agent’s expected utility of this lottery is equal to Unl(wnl, q¯nl). Because the lottery exposes the
agent to less risk in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance, it must have a lower expected
value than the lottery induced by the no liability contract, which means lower cost for the principal.
In a second step, we consider the limit ∆→ 0 and show that a completely uninformative signal
is worthless. For an uninformative signal it holds that λ(q) = 12 for all q and q¯
c ∈ (0, 1). If w is the
optimal wage, then we define a new contract w˜ by u˜R = uR, u˜0 = u0 and u˜L = 12uL +
1
2uA. This
contract, with the standard set at zero, implements the same cut-off and the same agent’s utility at
a lower cost for the principal. It must therefore be that the optimal standard is already equal to
zero and w = w˜.
It remains to show that the principal’s payoff piλ(w, q¯), once it is equal to pinl(wnl, q¯nl) for some
∆¯, stays larger than pinl(wnl, q¯nl) for all ∆ > ∆¯. Let q¯ be the optimal threshold for ∆¯, and q¯c the
optimal standard. First note that if the limited liability constraint (LL) is binding at this point,
then the same payoff can be achieved for all ∆ > ∆¯ as well. We assume in the following that (LL) is
not binding and show that as ∆ increases, this particular q¯ becomes easier to implement. To do this,
we select standards q¯c(∆) such that λ(q¯) is the same for all ∆ ≥ ∆¯. That is, we define a function
q¯c(∆) by
Φ(q¯c(∆)− q,∆) = Φ(q¯c − q, ∆¯), (64)
where we have modified the earlier notation to make the dependence on precision explicit. This
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function is differentiable in ∆ as long as q¯c(∆) ∈ (0, 1). We now look at the principal’s cost of
implementing q¯ as the decision threshold, taking the standard q¯c(∆) as given. This cost C(q¯) is
derived in the proof of Proposition 2. We take the derivative of the cost with respect to ∆, which
varies ρλ. Note that by definition of the standard q¯c(∆), λ(q¯) does not vary with ∆.
∂C(q¯)
∂∆
= −∂ρλ
∂∆
(wL −A) + (µ4 + µ3 + µ2)(uL − uA)∂ρλ
∂∆
. (65)
It follows from Assumption 1 that ∂ρλ(q¯)∂∆ ≤ 0. To see this, note that when we choose q¯c(∆) such
that λ(q,∆) and λ(q, ∆¯) intersect at q = q¯, then it must hold that
∂
∂q
λ(q¯,∆) <
∂
∂q
λ(q¯,∆¯) (66)
and consequently λ(q,∆) ≤ λ(q, ∆¯) for all q ≥ q¯, which means that ρλ must be decreasing in ∆.
Furthermore, as in the proof of Proposition 2, here it holds that
µ4 + µ3 + µ2 ≥ 1
u′(wL)
. (67)
Because (wL − A)u′(wL) ≤ uL − uA, the derivative in (65) is negative. Hence, we have shown that
cost decreases in precision if we take q¯c(∆) as the standard for ∆. If we take the optimal standard,
cost can only decrease further. Hence, the principal’s payoff is increasing in the precision of the
signal. 
Proof of Proposition 4. This time, we cannot a priori exclude the case that the monotonicity
constraint is binding in the other direction (w0 = wR). However, as we will show in the following,
if w0 = wR is optimal then also q¯c = 0 and q¯c0 = 1. To this end, let λ the probability of being
liable after the risky choice and l the probability of being liable after the safe choice, defined by the
optimal standards q¯c and q¯c0, and let w be the optimal wage. This contract induces a threshold q¯,
given by
q¯uR + (1− q¯)((1− λ(q¯))uL + λ(q¯)uA) = u0 − l(q¯)(u0 − uA) (68)
Let Uλ(w, q¯) denote the agent’s payoff under the liability rule and contract w. The other constraints
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(PC), (RIC), (SIC) are
Uλ(w, q¯) ≥ u¯ (69)
Uλ(w, q¯) ≥ puR + (1− p)uA (70)
Uλ(w, q¯) ≥ (1− p)u0 + puA (71)
For the regime of no liability for a violation of substantive due care, we set w˜R = w˜L = w˜0 = U
λ(w, q¯)
such that the agent’s payoff is the same, i.e. w˜ is defined to be the wage at which Unl(w˜, q¯) =
Uλ(w, q¯). It then holds that w˜R ≤ wR. The agent is indifferent between all decisions and will
provide the efficient one. The constraints are still satisfied:
Unl(w˜, q¯FB) ≥ u¯ (72)
Unl(w˜, q¯FB) ≥ pu˜R + (1− p)uA (73)
Unl(w˜, q¯FB) ≥ (1− p)u˜0 + puA (74)
In case that u0 = uR, the last inequality (i.e. the safe constraint) follows from the original safe
constraint, and for the case that p = 12 , it follows from the risky constraint. Since the agent is
completely insured, the principal’s payoff is higher.
In general, it may be the case that the so defined w˜0 is larger than the original w0. In these
cases, we can only show that q¯c0 = 1 optimally, but not necessarily q¯c = 0. Compared to the main
part of the paper, the problem of minimizing cost has changed in the following way:
minwL,w0,wR ρRwR + ρLwL − ρλ(wL −A) + ρ0w0 − ρl(w0 −A) (75)
+µ1(q¯uR + (1− q¯)((1− λ(q¯))uL + λ(q¯)uA)− u0 + l(q¯)(u0 − uA))
+µ2(ρRuR + ρLuL − ρλ(uL − uA) + ρ0u0 − ρl(u0 − uA)− κ− u0(1− p)− uAp)
+µ3(ρRuR + ρLuL − ρλ(uL − uA) + ρ0u0 − ρl(u0 − uA)− κ− puR − (1− p)uA)
+µ4(ρRuR + ρLuL − ρλ(uL − uA) + ρ0u0 − ρl(u0 − uA)− κ− u¯)
+µ5(u0 − uL)
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with
ρl(q¯) =
ˆ q¯
0
l(q)dF. (76)
The first order conditions are now
1
u′(w0)
= −1− l(q¯)
ρ0 − ρl µ1 −
1− p
ρ0 − ρlµ2 + µ2 + µ3 + µ4 +
µ5
ρ0 − ρl (77)
1
u′(wR)
=
q¯
ρR
µ1 + µ2 +
(ρR − p)
ρR
µ3 + µ4 (78)
1
u′(wL)
=
(1− q¯)(1− λ(q¯))
(ρL − ρλ) µ1 + µ2 + µ3 + µ4 −
µ5
ρL − ρλ (79)
Only the first constraint has changed, and it follows immediately that
µ4 + µ3 + µ2 ≥ 1
u′(w0)
(80)
if either µ1 < 0 (from (78)) or if µ1 > 0 and µ5 = 0 (from (77)). For the case that µ1 > 0 and
(MON) is binding, the first and the third condition together yield
1
u′(w0)
=
(1− q¯)(1− λ(q¯))− 1 + l(q¯)
ρ0 − ρl + ρL − ρλ µ1 −
1− p
ρ0 − ρl + ρL − ρλµ2 + µ2 + µ3 + µ4.
As before, µ1 is multiplied with a negative term. This follows directly if l(q¯) = q¯Φ(q¯− q¯c0), and more
generally it follows form (D), which takes the form
q¯(uR − u0) = ((1− q¯)λ(q¯)− l(q¯))(u0 − uA), (81)
and hence implies (1− q¯)λ(q¯)− l(q¯) ≥ 0. We can then deduce as in the proof of Proposition 2 that
µ1 < 0. Taking the derivative with respect to q¯c0 yields
−∂ρl
∂q¯c0
(w0 −A) + (µ4 + µ3 + µ2)(u0 − uA)∂ρl
∂q¯c0
− µ1∂l(q¯)
∂q¯c0
(u0 − uA) ≤ 0. (82)
Hence, the cost of implementing any q¯ is decreasing in q¯c0. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We will show that if the signal is as precise as stated and the standard
is set at e¯c = e˜, then we can achieve the same outcome as with a perfect signal. First, we will show
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that given the assumption about Ψ0(e˜), the safe constraint always binds. If (SIC) did not exist,
the best way to implement q¯ and e = 1 would be by setting uR = u0 = uL = u¯+ κ and q¯c = 0. The
constraints (D), (PC), (MON) would be naturally satisfied, and (RIC) would take the form
u¯ ≥ u¯+ κ−Ψ0(e˜)(1− p)(u¯+ κ− uA). (83)
To conclude from the assumption on Ψ0(e˜) that this condition is satisfied, we have to show that
(u¯+ κ− uA)(1− p)p ≥ (u¯− uA)
ˆ 1
p
(q − p)dF, (84)
which holds because (1− p)p ≥ ´ 1p (q − p)dF is equivalent to
ˆ p
0
qdF +
ˆ 1
p
pdF ≥
ˆ 1
0
qpdF. (85)
The result that (SIC) binds holds true both for linear contracts and monotonic ones. It implies
the result of Proposition 2, because in the proof only (SIC) and (D) were used to show how wages
compare. Next, we will show that (RIC) is not binding if q¯c = 0. This follows immediately for
q¯ ≥ p because in that case (RIC) follows directly from (SIC) :
u0 = q¯uR + (1− q¯)uL ≥ puR + (1− p)uL − (1− p)Ψ0(e˜)(uL − uA). (86)
Next we consider the case q¯ < p and assume to the contrary that (RIC) is binding. Together with
(D) it yields
(uR − uL)
ˆ q¯
0
(q¯ − q)dF + (uL − uA)Ψ0(e˜)(1− p) = κ, (87)
while (SIC) and (D) together yield
(uR − uL)
ˆ 1
q¯
(q − q¯) = κ, (88)
and (PC) and (D) together yield
uL − uA + (uR − uL)(ρR + ρ0q¯) ≥ κ+ u¯− uA. (89)
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From (87) and (89) we take that
(uR − uL)
ˆ q¯
0
(q¯ − q)dF + Ψ0(e˜)(1− p)
(
κ+ u¯− uA − (ρR + ρ0q¯)(uR − uL)
) ≤ κ, (90)
which implies
Ψ0(e˜)(1− p)(u¯− uA) ≤ κ+ (1− p)
(
(ρR + ρ0q¯)(uR − uL)− κ
)− (uR − uL) ˆ q¯
0
(q¯ − q)dF. (91)
Exploiting (88) this can be rearranged to yield
Ψ0(e˜) ≤ (1− q¯)pκ
(1− p)(u¯− uA)
´ 1
q¯ (q − q¯)dF
(92)
Since the right-hand side is increasing in q¯, this contradicts our assumption on Ψ0(e˜). Hence, we can
deduce also for q¯ < p that (RIC) is not binding. The outcome of the optimal contract for q¯c = 0
must hence be the same as with a perfect signal. This shows the result of Proposition 1, and it
also implies that for monotonic contracts and all ∆ ≤ ∆¯, the outcome of the optimal contract is
still the same. In the case that there is also liability following the safe project and F is the uniform
distribution, the contract uR = uL = ur = u¯+ κ is implementable because of (83). 
Proof of Corollary 1. For linear contracts we know that q¯ ≥ q¯FB ≥ p always holds. It follows
from (86) in the proof of Proposition 5 with Ψ0(e˜) = 0 that for q¯ ≥ p, (SIC) is stricter than (RIC).
Hence, the outcome with e¯c = 0 is the same as with a perfect signal and a standard of e¯c = 1.
For the case of more general contracts, Lambert (1986) treats the case of q¯c = 0 and e¯c = 0 in
detail and shows that if q¯FB > p holds(RIC) is not binding, which gives us the result. 
37
References
Allen, William T., Jack B. Jacobs, and Leo E. Strine Jr., “Realigning the Standard of Review
of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny
as a Standard of Review Problem,” Northwestern University Law Review, 2002, 96 (2), 449–466.
Black, Bernard S., Brian R. Cheffins, and Michael Klausner, “Outside Director Liability,”
Stanford Law Review, 2006a, 58, 1055–1159.
, , and , “Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis,” Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics, 2006b, 162 (1), 5–20.
Bundesgerichtshof, “Judgment 3 StR 470/04 of December 21, 2005,” Entscheidungen des Bundes-
gerichtshofs in Strafsachen, 2005, 50 (1), 331–346.
Campbell, Rutherford B., “Normative Justifications for Lax (or No) Corporate Fiduciary Duties:
A Tale of Problematic Principles, Imagined Facts and Inefficient Outcomes,” Kentucky Law
Journal, 2011, 99 (2), 231–257.
Chancery Court of Delaware, “Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc., Atlantic Reporter,”
Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series, 1996, 683, 1049–1055.
, “In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation,” Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series, 2009,
964, 106–140.
Demski, Joel S. and David E. M. Sappington, “Delegated Expertise,” Journal of Accounting
Research, April 1987, 25 (1), 68–89.
Eisenberg, Melvin Aron, “The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in
Corporate Law,” Fordham Law Review, 62 (3).
Fairfax, Lisa, “Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through
Legal Liability,” Houston Law Review, 2005, 42, 393–456.
Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control,” Journal of
Law and Economics, June 1983, 26 (2), 301–325.
38
Fischel, Daniel R., “The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case,” The Business
Lawyer, 1985, 40, 1437–1455.
Gevurtz, Franklin A., “Disney in a Comparative Light,” American Journal of Comparative Law,
2007, 55 (3), 453–492.
Gromb, Denis and David Martimort, “Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise,”
Journal of Economic Theory, November 2007, 137 (1), 271–299.
Gutierrez, Maria, “An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors’ Fiduciary Duties,” The RAND
Journal of Economics, October 2003, 34 (3), 516–535.
Hakenes, Hendrik and Isabel Schnabel, “Bank Bonuses and Bail-Outs,” CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 8852, 2012.
Innes, Robert D, “Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices,” Journal
of Economic Theory, October 1990, 52 (1), 45–67.
Institute, American Law, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations,
Vol. 1, St. Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute Publishers, 1992.
Kadan, Ohad and Jeroen M. Swinkels, “Stocks or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability, and
the Design of Compensation Contracts,” Review of Financial Studies, January 2008, 21 (1),
451–482.
Lambert, Richard A., “Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects,” The RAND Journal of
Economics, April 1986, 17 (1), 77–88.
and David F. Larcker, “Stock Options, Restricted Stock, and Incentives,” SSRN eLibrary,
April 2004.
Malcomson, James M, “Principal and Expert Agent,” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
January 2009, 9 (1).
Malcomson, James M., “Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An
Information Acquisition Model,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2011, 20 (1),
83–120.
39
Matthews, Steven A., “Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts under Limited Liability and Mono-
tonicity,” Journal of Economic Theory, March 2001, 97 (1), 1–29.
Nowicki, Elizabeth, “Director Inattention and Director Protection under Delaware General Cor-
poration Law Section 102(B)(7): A Proposal for Legislative Reform,” Delaware Journal of
Corporate Law, 2008, 33 (3), 695–718.
Rachlinski, Jeffrey John, Andrew J. Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie, “Probable Cause, Prob-
ability, and Hindsight,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2011, 8 (S1), 72–98.
Raith, Michael, “Specific knowledge and performance measurement,” RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 2008, 39 (4), 1059–1079.
Supreme Court of Delaware, “Aronson v. Lewis,” Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series, 1984, 473, 805–
818.
, “Smith v. Van Gorkom,” Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series, 1985, 488, 858–899.
, “Brehm v. Eisner,” Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series, 2000, 746, 244–268.
, “In re the Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation,” Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series, 2006,
906, 27–75.
Supreme Court of Michigan, “Dodge v. Ford Motor Co,” Northwestern Reporter, 1919, 170,
668–685.
Ulmer, Peter, “Haftungsfreistellung bis zur Grenze grober Fahrlässigkeit bei unternehmerischen
Fehlentscheidungen von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat?,” Der Betrieb, 2004, 57 (16), 859–863.
40
